
Keeping Out the Other: A Critical Introduction to Immigration Enforcement Today. April, 2008, ISBN: 978-0-231-14129-1, For additional information, Columbia University Press.
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In the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U. S.), 2004 I. C. J. 12 (Avena), the International Court of Justice(ICJ) held that the United States had violated Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention or Convention) by failing to inform 51 named Mexican nationals, including petitioner Medellín, of their Vienna Convention rights. The ICJ found that those named individuals were entitled to review and reconsideration of their U. S. state-court convictions and sentences regardless of their failure to comply with generally applicable staterules governing challenges to criminal convictions. In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U. S. 331—issued after Avena but involving individuals who were not named in the Avena judgment—this Court held, contrary to the ICJ’s determination, that the Convention did not preclude the application of state default rules. The President then issued a memorandum (President’s Memorandum or Memorandum) stating that the United States would “discharge its international obligations” under Avena “by having State courts give effect to the decision.”
Relying on Avena and the President’s Memorandum, Medellín filed a second Texas state-court habeas application challenging his state capital murder conviction and death sentence on the ground that he had not been informed of his Vienna Convention rights. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Medellín’s application as anabuse of the writ, concluding that neither Avena nor the President’s Memorandum was binding federal law that could displace the State’s limitations on filing successive habeas applications.
Held: Neither Avena nor the President’s Memorandum constitutes directly
enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the filing of successive habeas petitions. Pp. 8–37.

As is common in drug courier prosecutions, there was no direct evidence of what Ayala knew; whether the jury could reasonably infer knowledge depends, as common sense would suggest, on the surrounding facts and circumstances.
The government points to a number of factors that make the finding of guilty knowledge plausible in this case. As the government expert testified at trial, the drugs had a very substantial street value--approximately $300,000--and drug suppliers might be unwilling to entrust such valuable cargo to an ignorant courier, fearing that she might be insufficiently motivated to ensure that it safely reaches its destination. We have acknowledged that this is a reasonable inference. United States v. Thomas, 467 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) (smugglers opt "for trusted and close associates . . . who are aware of the high stakes"), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1850 (2007); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 192 F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases).
The opposite inference is also possible, see United States v.Del Aguila-Reyes, 722 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 1983) (Rubin, J.,dissenting) (noting that "dupes who are unaware that they carry valuable cargo are less likely to steal it"); but the jury has leeway in considering which inference is more persuasive on givenfacts.
Ayala acknowledged placing the packages in her luggage; this is not a case of a hidden compartment or the professed surprise discovery of items packed by another. See United States v. Diaz-Carreon, 915 F.2d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1990). The heavy wrapping made it impossible to tell what was inside, but that could easily cut against Ayala's story in the jury's mind; why would flour or coffee be packaged in such a strange fashion? Here, it is the circumstances of this case that work against the defendant.
Further, Ayala testified at trial; and "the jury is permitted to draw an inference of guilt from a deliberate false alibi." United States v. Llinas, 373 F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir. 2004) (concurring opinion). The prosecutor's cross examination gave the jury a series of reasons to believe that Ayala was lying:
● she had never met Miguel before but planned to meet him outside the port and accept a ride to San Juan;
● she did not know Miguel's last name or phone number, or Ivelisse's phone number;
● she initially claimed to have told the customs officials that the packages contained coffee, but later admitted that she had told them it was flour for baking cakes; and
● her explanation for her roundabout route between the Dominican Republic and New York was attacked as implausible for a variety of reasons.
The jury might also have been skeptical that anyone would bother to transport a few kilograms of coffee or flour to Puerto Rico, especially in light of that island's own famous, historic coffee industry. The jury is entitled to evaluate the witnesses, including Ayala, and could fairly have concluded that she lacked credibility. From that determination, especially in combination with the circumstantial evidence described above, an inference of guilt and a conviction may follow.

So instead of calling the police, she turned on the video recorder in her cellphone, put the phone in her purse and walked to meet the agent. Two family members said they watched anxiously from their parked car as she disappeared behind the tinted windows of his red Lexus.
“We were worried that the guy would take off, take her away and do something to her,” the woman’s widowed sister-in-law said in Spanish.
As the recorder captured the agent’s words and a lilting Guyanese accent, he laid out his terms in an easy, almost paternal style. He would not ask too much, he said: sex “once or twice,” visits to his home in the Bronx, perhaps a link to other Colombians who needed his help with their immigration problems.




