
Ask The Expert: Margaret van
Naerssen on the Admissibility of Discourse Analysis
In
USA v Amawi, a federal court judge granted the government's motion to exclude testimony from a renown forensic linguist, Roger
Shuy. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38287.
An excerpt of the opinion can be found
here. Editor: We asked expert, Dr. Margaret van Naerssen, to comment on the Court's pre-trial decision to exclude Dr. Shuy's testimony.
Dr. van Naerssen has a Ph.D. in applied linguistics/language acquisition from the University of Southern California (1981), and is now on the faculty at Immaculata University (Pennsylvania), coordinating graduate-level teacher training programs in cultural and linguistic diversity. She is also occasionally an English language specialist overseas with the U.S. Department of State. Since 1997 she's done expert consultant/witness work in forensic linguistics at the federal and state level, in criminal and civil cases involving murder, rape, drugs, money laundering, robbery, perjury, fraud, contract and plain language guidelines, slander, medical malpractice, and interpreting issues. A majority of her cases have involved non-native speakers of English. She's has published and given presentations on forensic linguistics, including at the Smithsonian Institute in Washington D.C. and at the FBI Academy.
Q: On reading the court's opinion, what was your general reaction to the Court having excluded Dr. Shuy's expert testimony from trial?
A: I'm particularly concerned about the negative effect that some of the wording of the court's opinion might have on future contributions by qualified forensic linguists doing careful and systematic linguistic analysis in other cases.
Q: The opinion suggests that Dr. Shuy did not testify prior to the court's ruling on the admissibility of the proffered testimony. Do you think this made some difference in the court's ultimate decision on admissability?
A: I think it might have though I don't know all the circumstances of the trial. The judge did not give Dr. Shuy an opportunity to respond to the Court's belief that the substance of Shuy's testimony is common knowledge. I've boldfaced the critical phrases.
"The first two of these analyses -- topics and responses -- as presented in Prof. Shuy's report, constitute little, if any, more than a recitation of what is readily discernible in the recorded conversations.
* * *"Prof. Shuy's response analysis likewise consists, in essence, of a recapitulation of readily ascertainable aspects of how El-Hindi and Griffin interacted, or failed to interact, during their various encounters and conversations. Thus, the first two segments of the proposed testimony provide nothing beyond that which the jury can hear for themselves, or from which counsel can urge them to draw the inferences they seek to have the jurors draw."
And in the court's reference to a precedent in USA v Evans: "The court also found that the expert's testimony would not assist the jury because the subject matter of the testimony, conversation, was one which could be expected to be within the general knowledge of jurors."
* * *"Such testimony was aimed not at explaining technical terms used in the conversation . Instead, this expert sought to interpret language in ordinary usage, which the district court found would have confused, not assisted, the jury."
I do think the court's arguments reflect a common concern linguists have when testifying in court. Non-linguists naturally think they know all there is to know about their language since they speak it, probably have spoken it all their lives, have been educated through it, and use it in their daily lives. However, they are NOT trained to look systematically for patterns and inconsistencies in language.
Q: Well, can't we all have opinions about our language?
A: Yes, but these opinions generally are more intuitive than based on rational theory and systematic linguistic evidence. Non-linguists use language everyday, so they are usually not accustomed to thinking about the rules they use when communicating. Just like when we walk, we don't think much about it unless we are having some sort of difficulty. We do it naturally. Native speakers have a hard time recalling specific formal grammar or spelling rules learned in elementary school. We usually don't need to refer to a rule since we use the language naturally, without thinking about it. Also the court appears to assume that a linguistic expert could only testify on technical terms used in a conversation, if there had been any. Yes, linguists do sometimes testify about the meaning of a word(s), for example, in cases on contracts or trademarks. But linguistic experts also testify about other areas as well.
Linguistics is the scientific study of the language and its systems. It's been accepted by the National Science Foundation as a legitimate area of scientific research. When analyzing conversations linguists can do analyses at both macro- and micro-levels. Discourse analysts focus on units of speech larger than the sentence and their relationship to the contexts in which they occur. Linguists doing discourse analyses of written or spoken communications are trained to look for certain features that help to reveal the overall structure, how the text holds together, including analysis of topics. (In examining covert law enforcement recordings, topic analysis is very important.)
Conversation analysts focus more on the micro-level. In doing conversation analysis they examine turn-taking, including the various features of interactions that mark who is controlling the interaction, communication breakdowns, misunderstandings, etc. Discourse and conversation analyses do not involve making intuitive judgments. They are grounded in principled research. In both linguists know which features are relevant and important to note and quantify. Linguists with experience in forensic settings bring the additional expertise of knowing how to relate an analysis to legal questions and consider which linguistic tools, strategies, and features are most relevant. Shuy is such an expert. [2]
Q: So once the analysis is completed, the expert then needs to report the findings to assist the fact finders in understanding the evidence in question?
A: Right. But here is the dilemma. Once an analysis is done, an effective expert then tries to make the findings accessible to non-linguists (attorneys, judges, jury members) – as you said, to assist them in better understanding the evidence before them. However, by making the findings accessible, then there may be the reaction, "Oh, I hadn't thought about that, but yes…of course, I see, that's common sense."
At the same time the findings must also be reported in a way that is accepted in the professional field of the expert. Perhaps it was this attempt to make evidence accessible to non-linguists --yet keep it grounded in theory-- that caused the judge
--To refer to the evidence in a disparaging way, "semi-academic dressage," as in "'conversational strategies' as contained in Prof. Shuy's proposed report, despite its semi-academic dressage."
--To use the argument: "within the general knowledge of jurors" by using that phrase--as well as "provide nothing beyond that which the jury can hear for themselves, or from which counsel can urge them to draw the inferences they seek to have the jurors draw.." and " what is readily discernible in the recorded conversations."
Thus, it is understandable that a non-linguist, such as a judge, may feel that what the expert has provided is within common knowledge so it is something the jury can intuit anyway. But it takes the linguist to know what to look for, to know how to do the analysis in a principled way so the analysis is well-grounded and patterns quantified so the findings are sound linguistic evidence, and not just intuition. The linguist also helps the fact-finders by keeping track of the patterns of interaction which the fact-finder is not likely to track systematically. But Dr. Shuy was not allowed to explain the basis of his analysis nor his findings to the fact finders.
Q: I see the dilemma, but isn't it a hard idea to get across to a non-linguist?
A: True, but let me paraphrase a comparison Shuy has made about the role of an expert. For example, based on my own basic education, media exposure, other life experiences, I can look at an x-ray of your chest. I can find your lungs, your basic skeletal bones, your intestines, your stomach, and your heart. I can do this without medical training. But if you were having a health problem, would you want me to try to diagnose the problem. No! You'd want a trained physician to do the diagnosis, right? To recognize the details and to know what they indicate.
In the same way, we all can intuit things about language. But suppose your life or freedom depended on others listening to a recording of you talking with another person. If you felt you were innocent, and if you felt you hadn't said anything incriminating, wouldn't you want an expert in linguistics to do the analysis?
Or would you prefer to leave it up to the jury to simply give their intuitive and mixed interpretations, influenced by the persuasive techniques of the attorneys, of what your meaning was, of was going on in the conversation? Of course, no one, not even the linguist, could know with absolute certainty what was happening in a person's mind. But in such a case an expert in linguistics can provide principled and useful insights to assist the fact finders. (Note: I am not addressing the specific claims in the case USA v Amawi)
Q: One last observation—the judge did say that "Other courts have found testimony of the sort proffered here, including testimony by Prof. Shuy, not to be admissible for similar reasons." Does that mean that no testimony involving analysis of conversations has been admitted in courts?
A: Wrong. It has been admitted in numerous cases. But these were not mentioned in the opinion. Such cases cannot be found in a search of cases unless a linguistic issue is the basis of an appeal. If Shuy had testified, he could have provided information on the numerous cases where his testimony has been admitted. For example, in a well-known case (US v John DeLorean), also involving covert recordings, Shuy's report was admitted and his findings became critical. The confidential informant, wired for recordings, used ambiguous references such "we," "this," "that," "interim deal," "interim financing," "interim thing." The government claimed these referred to the early stages of building a drug business. Shuy was brought into analyze the tapes. He was able to show that throughout the conversations DeLorean's understanding of "interim deal" etc., referred to a more benign investment.
Finally when DeLorean realized the government informant was referring specifically to a drug deal, Shuy also was able to show how DeLorean, through language, tried to distance himself. DeLorean even concocted the IRA as a protector– saying that they wouldn't want to him to be involved in anything that was illegal. It was Shuy's analysis and testimony on this SPECIFIC conversation that convinced the judge and jury, by then angry and outraged, that this was clearly a case of entrapment. DeLorean was set free. [3]
Thanks for giving me a chance to discuss my thoughts on this court opinion. I hope these comments give you-- and other officers of the court--a few insights on what an expert witness in linguistics can offer "beyond common knowledge" about language evidence
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[1] I am not directly familiar with the details of the case except as presented in the several excerpts of the judicial opinions that Linda Ramirez has posted.
[2] Dr. Shuy is recognized internationally as a leader in the forensic linguistics community. He is well respected for his ethics and overall professionalism and his scholarship in the applied linguistics field, having been given the Award for Distinguished Scholarship and Service, by the American Association, March 1999. In the area of Discourse Analysis, and especially in examining undercover communications as in this case, he is the best expert there is.
[3] The case is discussed in Shuy's 1993 book, Language Crimes; in an unpublished paper by Shuy, "Using a Linguist in Tape Cases," pp. 11-12; and in personal communication, 9/8/05.