Alien Tort Statute: Nigerian Plaintiff Case Reinstated

On January 31, 2009, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Abdullah v Pfizer, reinstated a law suit against Pfizer for claims that Pfizer illegally conducted undisclosed experiements on Nigerians. The case had previously been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

"This consolidated appeal is from the judgments of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, J.) dismissing two complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (“ATS”), and in the alternative, on the ground of forum non conveniens. Plaintiffs-Appellants Rabi Abdullahi and other Nigerian children and their guardians sued Defendant-Appellee Pfizer, Inc. under the ATS (“the Abdullahi action”). They alleged that Pfizer violated a customary international law norm prohibiting involuntary medical experimentation on humans when it tested an experimental antibiotic on children in Nigeria, including themselves, without their consent or knowledge.

Immigrant Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

An American organization - Latino Justice PRLDEF - has filed a claim before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, alleging violation of immigrant rights in the United States.

" The United States is violating the human rights of Latinos living within the country’s borders, according to a petition filed today with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by Latino Justice PRLDEF. The rarely-used international procedure charges that the U.S. Government is failing to protect its Latino residents."

Additional information can be found at El Diario:
http://www.impre.com/eldiariony/opinion/2008/12/19/a-petition-for-human-rights-99060-1.html and the NYT: Assaults on Latinos Spur Inquiry.

Interpreter Hearsay: Fourth Circuit Applies Language Conduit Rule

The Fourth Circuit applied the "language conduit" principle, in affirming the conviction of a Bosnian national, convicted of make false statements in an application for refugee status. United States v Vidacak, January 23, 2009.

"Both parties rely upon United States v. Martinez-Gayton, 213 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2000) as the central case dealing with the hearsay rule and interpreters. In Martinez-Gayton, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that "except ‘in unusual circumstances, an interpreter is no more than a language conduit and therefore his translation does not create an additional level of hearsay.’" Id. at 892 (quoting United States v. Cordero, 18 F.3d 1248, 1252 (5th Cir. 1994)). From this general rule, some courts have carved out a narrow exception that is applied "where the particular facts of a case cast significant doubt upon the accuracy of a translated confession." Four factors have been identified by courts to determine whether this exception applies: "1) which party supplied the interpreter; 2) whether the interpreter had a
motive to mislead or distort; 3) the interpreter’s qualifications and language skills; and 4) whether actions taken subsequent to the conversation were consistent with the statements translated."

Martinez-Gayton, 213 F.3d at 892 (citing United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 525-27 (9th Cir. 1991)). The Fifth Circuit concluded that "where the particular facts of a case cast significant doubt upon the accuracy of a translated confession, the translator or a witness who heard and understood the untranslated confession must be available for testimony and cross-examination" before the statement can be admitted.

Applying the factors set forth in Martinez-Gayton to the record, we hold that application of the narrow exception is not warranted in this case and the translation did not create an additional level of hearsay. Duchka was an employee of the IOM, which is an independent United Nations-funded agency that assists refugees; there is no indication that she was selected by the United States government. In addition, there is no evidence suggesting that Duchka harbored any bias against Vidacak, or that she had any motive to mislead or distort. The record reflects that Duchka was highly skilled and reliable and Officer Tierney testified that Duchka was one of the best interpreters with whom she had ever worked. Finally, Vidacak later confessed in his post-arrest interview that he had served in the VRS and that he had knowingly omitted any mention of his military background on his immigration applications. Accordingly, we conclude that the interpreter Duchka was, under the circumstances of this case, no more than a "language conduit" and that Officer Tierney’s testimony was not double hearsay. "

Federal Sentencing: Cultural Assimilation is a 3553 Factor

January 22, 2009, USA v Rosas-Caraveo, " Cultural assimilation, while perhaps not a proper basis for a downward departure, can be considered by the court in determining whether to vary from the applicable guideline range under § 3553(a)."

Vienna Convention and Consular Assistance: ICJ Finds US in Violation

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) on January 19, 2009, issued a Judgment in the matter of Mexico v United States.

According to Sandra Babcock, Clinical director of the Center for Int'l Human Rights at Northwestern School of Law, " the ICJ concluded that the US violated its international legal obligations by executing Jose Medellin; the ICJ emphasized that the United States is bound to provide the judicial review mandated by the ICJ in the cases of all Mexican nationals named in the Avena judgment. The ICJ discussed the Supreme Court's decision in Medellin II, and made clear that the United States has to find an alternative means of ensuring the Avena judgment is implemented , for example, through legislation. "

Guantanamo: More Detainees are Found to have been Detained Improperly

New York Times, January 19, 2009, Rulings of Improper Detentions as the Bush Era Closes

"For nearly six years, Haji Bismullah, an Afghan detainee at Guantánamo Bay, has insisted that he was no terrorist, but had actually fought the Taliban and had later been part of the pro-American Afghan government. Over the weekend, the Bush administration flew him home after a military panel concluded that he “should no longer be deemed an enemy combatant.”
Asked about the panel’s decision, which was not publicly announced and seemed to acknowledge a mistake of grand proportions, a Pentagon spokeswoman said, “Mr. Bismullah was lawfully detained as an enemy combatant based on the information that was available at the time.”
The decision was part of a pattern that has emerged in the closing chapter of the administration. In the last three months, at least 24 detainees have been declared improperly held by courts or a tribunal — or nearly 10 percent of the population at the detention camp in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where about 245 men remain."

"In a decision on Wednesday ordering the release of a prisoner who had been a Saudi resident, Judge Richard J. Leon of Federal District Court said the government’s case was largely based on inconsistent accusations from two other Guantánamo detainees whose credibility the government itself had questioned. That case involved Mohammed el Gharani, who was detained when he was 14. One of the government’s claims was that Mr. Gharani had been a member of a Qaeda cell in London. His lawyers at the British legal group Reprieve argued that the government’s assertions would have meant that he was a member of the cell at age 11.
“Putting aside the obvious unanswered questions as to how a Saudi minor from a very poor family could have even become a member of a London-based cell,” Judge Leon said, “the government simply advances no corroborating evidence for these statements.”

Immigration Consequences: Simple Possession Just Got Simpler

IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES: SIMPLE DRUG POSSESSION JUST GOT SIMPLER

By David B. Pakula*
Recent developments in immigration law have gone a long way toward putting the “simple” back in simple possession. These major changes in the law began with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 625 (2006), and culminated in two December 2007 precedent decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the administrative body that reviews immigration court rulings.

Drug offenses, including simple possession, have long resulted in adverse immigration consequences, such as deportation (now “removal”) and ineligibility for many immigration benefits. If a simple possession conviction is classified as an “aggravated felony” under immigration law, the person is ineligible for most types of immigration benefits and relief. The harsh collateral effects of an aggravated felony include ineligibility for cancellation of removal and asylum, inability to naturalize, longer waiting periods for re-entering the United States after removal, and stricter criminal penalties for unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States.

According to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a federal simple possession conviction is an aggravated felony for immigration purposes if it is punishable as a felony under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. Under federal law, first offense simple possession convictions are punishable as misdemeanors (with the exception of first-time convictions for possession of cocaine base or flunitrazepam, the “date rape” drug), and hence they are not aggravated felonies. However, recidivist simple possession offenses are punishable as felonies. See 21 USC §844(a). Therefore, a second or subsequent simple possession conviction may be classified as an aggravated felony for immigration purposes.

The INA definition raises questions about when a state conviction should be considered to be an aggravated felony. In Matter of Yanez, 23 I&N Dec. 390 (BIA 2002), the BIA adopted the majority view of the U.S. circuit courts of appeal, including the Eleventh Circuit. According to that approach, a state simple possession conviction was an “aggravated felony” for immigration purposes if it was classified as a felony by the state. That was true even if the offense would be classified as a misdemeanor in the federal system.

In its December 2006 Lopez decision, the Supreme Court rejected the Yanez approach. In Lopez, the court held that “a state offense constitutes a ‘felony punishable under the Controlled Substance Act’ only if it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under that federal law.” 127 S. Ct. at 633. The court’s holding suggests that a state simple possession conviction is an aggravated felony if it hypothetically could be punished as a recidivist felony in the federal system. However, the court’s opinion does not get any more specific than that.

As immigration courts began applying Lopez, it became clear that there are two different interpretations of what constitutes a state counterpart to a federal recidivist possession offense. 21 U.S.C § 844(a) provides that a drug possession offense can be punished as “recidivist possession” after a prior drug conviction has become final. The government took the position that if the alien has any prior simple possession convictions that have become final (by the expiration of direct appeal), he or she is a recidivist aggravated felon because the latest offense could have been punished as a recidivist felony in the federal system. The government’s position found support in the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Second, Fifth and Seventh Circuits.

Advocates for aliens in removal proceedings pointed out that in the federal system, a second or subsequent simple possession offense is not automatically treated as a recidivist felony. 21 U.S.C. § 851 of the Controlled Substances Act precludes a federal judge from enhancing a drug offender’s sentence on the basis of recidivism absent compliance with a number of safeguards that protect the defendant’s right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. If the prosecutor does not invoke these procedures, if they are not followed, or if the government does not prove its position beyond a reasonable doubt, a recidivist sentence cannot be applied. Hence, a state simple possession conviction should not be treated as the counterpart of a recidivist federal felony unless corresponding due process has been afforded in the state court.

The issue was decided by the BIA in two precedent decisions issued in December 2007. In In re Caruachuri-Rosendo, 24 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA 2007), an en banc decision, the Board first noted that it owes deference to the U.S. Courts of Appeal, and therefore its decision does not disturb the current law in the second, fifth and seventh circuits. However, citing Lopez, the Board found it “inappropriate to treat a series of misdemeanor possession offenses as ‘trafficking’ felonies unless we are confident that the State offense corresponds in a meaningful way to the essential requirements that must be met before a felony sentence can be imposed under Federal law on the basis of recidivism.” Accordingly, the Board concluded that “absent circuit law to the contrary… a State conviction cannot ‘proscribe conduct punishable as’ recidivist possession unless the State successfully sought to impose punishment for a recidivist drug conviction. This means that the respondent’s status as a recidivist drug possessor must have been admitted or determined by a court or jury within the prosecution for the second drug crime.” 24 I&N Dec. at 390-91.

The second BIA decision, issued on the same day, involved a Florida conviction (the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to the charge and received a withheld adjudication, which counts as a “conviction” for immigration purposes) for possession of 20 grams or less of marijuana. The government alleged that this constituted a recidivist aggravated felony conviction because the alien had a prior Florida conviction for cocaine possession that had become final prior to the entry of the second conviction. In In re Thomas, 24 I&N Dec. 416 (BIA 2007), in a two to one decision the Board followed In re Caruachuri-Rosendo because of the absence of Eleventh Circuit precedent to the contrary. The record did not reflect either that the alien had admitted to recidivist status or that a judge or jury had determined the alien’s recidivist status in connection with his plea to the marijuana possession charge. Therefore, the Board held that the offense did not qualify as a recidivist aggravated felony. In so holding, the court noted that “it is not clear that Florida law provides any recidivist enhancement mechanism for… simple possession offenses.” 24 I&N Dec. at 422.


In view of these BIA precedent decisions, the determination of whether a state simple possession conviction constitutes an aggravated felony for immigration purposes no longer depends on whether state law classifies the offense as a misdemeanor or a felony. The issue now boils down to whether the state conviction would qualify as a rescidivist felony under the federal system. This issue is determined by a three-step analysis.

The first step is to determine whether the alien’s criminal record reflects a prior final drug possession conviction. If there are no prior convictions, and the drug offense is not otherwise classified as a federal felony (i.e., a first-time conviction for possession of cocaine base or flunitrazepam), then the offense is not classified as an aggravated felony and the analysis is complete.

If the record reflects a prior final possession conviction, the second step in the analysis requires a determination of the law in the applicable U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. If the applicable circuit follows the approach currently in effect in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth and Seventh Circuits, then the offense is classified as an aggravated felony.

If the applicable circuit law follows the BIA approach or is silent on this question, then the third step in the analysis requires a determination of whether the respondent’s status as a recidivist drug possessor has been admitted or determined by a court or jury within the prosecution for the second drug crime. In states like Florida, in which there is no mechanism for rescidivist enhancement, the offense will not be classified as an aggravated felony. In states that have rescidivist offender provisions for simple possession offenses, a case by case analysis of the criminal record needs to be performed to determine whether the offense constitutes an aggravated felony for immigration purposes.

*****

* David B. Pakula is a solo practitioner in Pembroke Pines, Florida. Mr. Pakula has authored articles on immigration law and litigation for Interpreter Releases, The Florida Bar Journal and Florida Defender, a publication of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. He is the author of an article on immigration-related federal court litigation for the 2008-09 edition of The Perm Book, published by ILW.com, and he has lectured on that subject in ILW.com-sponsored continuing legal education seminars. Mr. Pakula is the winner of the 2002 Amicus Award of the Florida Defense Lawyers Association. His website is found at http://www.floridaimmigrationlaw.us/

Immigration Crimes: Federal Prosecutors Demoralized with Rising Prosecutions

The New York Times January 12, 2009, reports on the exponential increase in prosecution of immigrants for illegal entry and illegal reentry, and the shift from prosecution from traditional crimes.

"Federal prosecutions of immigration crimes nearly doubled in the last fiscal year, reaching more than 70,000 immigration cases in the 2008 fiscal year, according to federal data compiled by a Syracuse University research group. The emphasis, many federal judges and prosecutors say, has siphoned resources from other crimes, eroded morale among federal lawyers and overloaded the federal court system. Many of those other crimes, including gun trafficking, organized crime and the increasingly violent drug trade, are now routinely referred to state and county officials, who say they often lack the finances or authority to prosecute them effectively."

Immigration Law: Alien has no Right to Effective Representation in Deportation Proceedings

Ruling Says Deportation Cases May Not Be Appealed Over Lawyer Errors, New York Times,

"The Bush administration has issued a ruling that illegal immigrants do not have a constitutional right to effective legal representation in deportation hearings, closing off one of the most common avenues for appealing deportation decisions. The ruling, by Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey, concerns three appeals by people ordered to be deported who said their cases had been hurt by mistakes by their lawyers. Mr. Mukasey wrote in an opinion released late Wednesday that “neither the Constitution nor any statutory or regulatory provision entitles an alien to a do-over if his initial removal proceeding is prejudiced by the mistakes of a privately retained lawyer.” Mukasey argued that the Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal—not civil—cases. The ruling will effectively prevent immigrants from appealing deportation orders even if they receive inadequate representation. Immigration advocates are expected to appeal the ruling. "


Matter of COMPEAN, BANGALY & J-E-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 710 (A.G. 2009)
(1) Aliens in removal proceedings have a statutory privilege to retain private counsel at no expense to the Government.(2) Aliens in removal proceedings have no right to counsel, including Government-appointed counsel, under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution because the Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal proceedings and removal proceedings are civil in nature.
(3) Aliens in removal proceedings also have no right to counsel, including Government-appointed counsel, under the Fifth Amendment. Although the Fifth Amendment applies to removal proceedings, its guarantee of due process does not include a general right to counsel, or a specific right to effective assistance of counsel, and is violated only by state action, namely, action that can be legally attributed to the Government. Lawyers privately retained by aliens in removal proceedings are not state actors for due process purposes. Accordingly, there is no Fifth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings. To the extent the Board’s decisions in Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and Matter of Assaad, 23 I&N Dec. 553 (BIA 2003), are inconsistent with this conclusion, those decisions are overruled.(4) Although the Constitution and the immigration laws do not entitle an alien in removal proceedings to relief for his lawyer’s mistakes, the Department of Justice may, as a matter of administrative grace, reopen removal proceedings where an alien shows that he was prejudiced by the actions of private counsel.
(5) There is a strong public interest in ensuring that a lawyer’s deficiencies do not affirmatively undermine the fairness and accuracy of removal proceedings. At the same time, there is a strong public interest in the expeditiousness and finality of removal proceedings. On balance, these interests justify allowing the Board to reopen removal proceedings in the extraordinary case where a lawyer’s deficient performance likely changed the outcome of an alien’s initial removal proceedings. In addition, they call for a set of standards and requirements that will allow the Board to resolve most claims expeditiously and on the basis of an alien’s motion to reopen and accompanying on counsel’s allegedly deficient performance is, in each case, committed to the discretion of the Board or the immigration judge.(6) The deficient performance of counsel claim extends only to the conduct of a lawyer, an accredited representative, or a non-lawyer that the alien reasonably but erroneously believed to be a lawyer who was retained to represent the alien in the proceedings.(7) An alien who seeks to reopen his removal proceedings based on deficient performance of counsel bears the burden of establishing (i) that his lawyer’s failings were egregious; (ii) that in cases where the alien moves to reopen beyond the applicable time limit, he exercised due diligence in discovering and seeking to cure his lawyer’s alleged deficient performance; and (iii) that he suffered prejudice from the lawyer’s errors, namely, that but for the deficient performance, it is more likely than not that the alien would have been entitled to the ultimate relief he was seeking.(8) An alien who seeks to reopen his removal proceedings based on deficient performance of counsel must submit a detailed affidavit setting forth the facts that form the basis of the deficient performance of counsel claim. He also must attach to his motion five documents or sets of documents: (i) a copy of his agreement, if any, with the lawyer whose performance he alleges was deficient; (ii) a copy of a letter to his former lawyer specifyingthe lawyer’s deficient performance and a copy of the lawyer’s response, if any; (iii) a completed and signed complaint addressed to, but not necessarily filed with, the appropriate State bar or disciplinary authority; (iv) a copy of any document or evidence, or an affidavit summarizing any testimony, that the alien alleges the lawyer failed to submit previously; and (v) a statement by new counsel expressing a belief that the performance of former counsel fell below minimal standards of professional competence. If any of these documents is unavailable, the alien must explain why. If any of these documents is missing rather than nonexistent, the alien must summarize the document’s contents in his affidavit. Matter of Lozada, superseded.(9) The Board’s discretion to reopen removal proceedings on the basis of a lawyer’s deficient performance is not limited to conduct that occurred during the agency proceedings. The Board may reopen on the basis of deficient performance that occurred subsequent to the entry of a final order of removal if the standards established for a deficient performance of counsel claim are satisfied.

International Human Rights Law: No Sovereign Immunity for Somalian Defendant

Yousef v Samantar, Fourth Circuit, January 8, 2009.

" Plaintiffs, all of whom are natives of Somalia, brought this action under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, see Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992), and the Alien Tort Statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1350, seeking to impose liability against and recover damages from Defendant Mohamed Ali Samantar for alleged acts of torture and human rights violations committed against them by government agents commanded by Samantar during the regime of Mohamed Siad Barre. The district court concluded that Samantar enjoys immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611, and dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the FSIA does not apply to individuals and, as a result, Samantar is not entitled to immunity under the FSIA. Because the FSIA does not apply in this case, it consequently does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the district court dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA and remand this action for further proceedings.

Immigration Advocacy: Spotlight on the National Immigration Project

Boston, MA 02108
Phone 617 227 9727
Fax 617 227 5495


The National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild is a national organization that exists to defend and protect the civil, legal, and constitutional rights of noncitizens in the United States. The organization is especially committed to working on behalf of vulnerable and disenfranchised noncitizens, including detainees, survivors of domestic violence, noncitizens with HIV/AIDS, and noncitizen criminal offenders. For more information, go to the NIP's fabulous website at http://nationalimmigrationproject.org/

Vienna Convention: NJ Court Rejects Claim

State v Caraballo, January 6, 2009, " Defendant contends that he, as a Dominican citizen, was not advised of his consular rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and therefore the remedy should be to bar the admissibility of the statement. He also contends that the record did not establish whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights and a remand for a voluntariness hearing is mandated. We reject both contentions.

In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2674-82, 165 L. Ed.2d 557 (2006), the United States Supreme Court concluded that a violation of Article 36, the consular notification and communication provision of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), does not require suppression of any statement or evidence as a remedy. Id . at 337, 126 S.Ct. at 2674, 165 L. Ed.2d at 570-71. For one, the treaty did not provide for any application of the exclusionary rule. Accordingly, to “read in” such a remedy would be to rewrite the treaty, a power the Court lacks. Id. at 346, 126 S.Ct. at 2679-82, 165 L. Ed.2d at 576. Second, the overwhelming number of nations, who are parties to the treaty, do not employ the exclusionary rule, thereby making it extremely unlikely that such a remedy was even contemplated by the parties. Id. at 343-44, 126 S.Ct. at 2678-79, 165 L. Ed.2d at 574-75. Third, the employment of the exclusionary rule would also be unwarranted given that a foreign national detained in the United States already enjoys the rights protected by the Due Process Clause; i.e., protection against compelled self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and the right against unreasonable search and seizures. Id. at 350, 126 S.Ct. at 2681-82, 165 L. Ed.2d at 578. In fact, defendant received his Miranda rights on the spot before police questioning and well before the arresting authority even is required to notify the consular post upon a request to do so. Id. at 362, 126 S.Ct. at 2689, 165 L. Ed.2d at 586 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

As a state court, we are bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law and treaties. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. According to the United States Supreme Court, the VCCR provides arrested foreign nationals with no greater rights than any other citizens or individuals so situated. We do not have the authority to ignore this construction of a federal treaty . Significantly, defendant here was accorded the same rights as any other citizen in being given his Miranda warnings before the police interview. Thus, the VCCR provides no basis to suppress defendant's oral statement made to Detective Love.

Jury Selection: Florida S. Ct. Court Reverses DP Improper Peremptory

On December 30, 2008 the Florida Supreme Court reversed a conviction in a death penalty case, in part due to an improper strike of a Hispanic Juror, and ordered a new trial for the defendant. Nowell v State of Florida.

Immigration Policy: Clark County Jail Staff now handling Deportations

Las Vegas Review-Journal 28 Inmates Deported under New Partnership.

" Immigration officials deported 28 foreign-born Clark County jail inmates during the first month of a new partnership with the Metropolitan Police Department. The partnership, which officially began Nov. 15, allows specially trained corrections officers at the Clark County Detention Center to identify immigration violators and start deportation proceedings against them. Hispanic and civil rights groups have criticized the agreement, saying it targets Hispanics and could lead to racial profiling and make people afraid to report crimes.

Ten corrections officers underwent several weeks of training with ICE officials as part of the agreement, which is the first of its kind in Nevada. The officers have access to a federal database of known immigration violators that tells them whether an inmate has been deported before or whether the citizenship status of that inmate is in question. Jail officials are authorized to put immigration detainers on inmates determined to be legally deportable, allowing ICE to step in upon resolution of criminal cases. "

Film of Note: El Alambrista (1977)

"The Fence Jumper", a great piece about the tragic experience of one Mexican immigrant who enters the United States illegally. Made in 1977, it could just has easily been 2009 with a few exceptions. (The real tragedy). Now showing on Flix. This may have originated as made for TV and then re-release in 2001. See Edward Olmos in one of his first films; however, Domingo Ambriz is the real star.

"After his daughter's birth, Roberto leaves his town in Michoacan to make money in the United States. He's "an illegal," crossing into California and taking work wherever he can: picking strawberries, grapes, lettuce, and cucumbers. He hitchhikes, rides freight trains, and depends on the kindness of strangers. Near Stockton, things look up when a sympathetic waitress gives him a place to live and he gets a better job washing helicopters. But immigration raids are a constant possibility that can end stability. " (from IMDB.com)

For those who have adored the film, "El Norte", this is a close second.